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Abstract. What are the ethical pitfalls of countering hybrid warfare? This article proposes an 
ontological security-LQVSLUHGUHDGLQJRIWKH(8DQG1$72¶VHQJagement with hybrid threats. 
It illustrates how hybrid threat management collapses their daily security struggles into 
ontological security management exercise. This has major consequences for defining the 
threshold of an Article 5 attack and the related response for NATO, and the maintenance of a 
particular symbolic order and identity narrative for the EU. The institutionalisation of hybrid 
threat counterDFWLRQHPHUJHVDVDURXWLQLVDWLRQVWUDWHJ\WRFRSHZLWKWKH³NQRZQXQNQRZQV´ 
Fostering resilience points at the problematic prospect of compromising the fuzzy distinction 
between politics and war: the logic of hybrid conflicts presumes that all politics could be 
reduced to a potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. Efficient hybrid threat 
management faces the central paradox of militant democracy whereby the very attempt to 
defend democracy might harm it. 
 





A specter is haunting the Western world ± the specter of hybrid warfare. All threats ³hybrid´ 
KDYHEHFRPHWKHEX]]ZRUGRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\FRPPHQWDULDWHYHUVLQFH5XVVLD¶VVZLIW
DQQH[DWLRQ RI &ULPHD LQ  ZLWK WKH KHOS RI WKH ³OLWWOH SROLWH JUHHQPHQ´1 DQG 5XVVLD¶V
involvement in the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. The allegedly Kremlin-led meddling 
in the US presidential elections of 2016 is the most recent high-profile episode in this sequence 
of low-LQWHQVLW\ ³SROLWLFDOZDUIDUH´GHVFULEHGE\ 0DUN*DOHRWWL E DV D ³st century 
conflict, more Machiavellian than military, where hacks, leaks and fake news are taking the 
SODFHRISODQHVERPEVDQGPLVVLOHV´6LPLODUGHVWDELOLVDWLRQFDPSDLJQVKDYHEHHQQRWLFHGLQ
the context of the French presidential election and in the build-up to German federal elections 
in 2017, and in numerous other European states.2 
:KLOHWKH³QHZZDUV´GHEDWHKDVDORQJSHGLJUHHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWXGLHV.DOGRU
2013; Henderson and Singer 2002; Evans 2003; Newman 2004; Smith 2005; Hoffman 2007; 
Münkler 2005; Strachan and Scheipers 2011), the scholarship has remained largely silent on 
the potential of these wars to generate immaterial insecurity effects. This article offers an 
ontological security-situated reading on the added insights WKHQRWLRQ³K\EULGZDUIDUH´brings 
to bear for our understanding of the contemporary Western security predicament. Ontological 
VHFXULW\ 26 LV D FRQGLWLRQ XQGHUSLQQLQJ WKH DFWRU¶V DELOLW\ WR DFW LQ WKH ZRUOG ZLWK EDVLF
                                                 
1
 Anthropologist Alexei Yurchak (2014) has invoked this expression to capture the Russian political technology 
of a military occupation staged as a non-occupation by anonymous troops without insignia.  
 
2
 E.g., ³+RVWLOHVWDWHVSRVHµIXQGDPHQWDOWKUHDW¶´. 
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confidence about how the world works and her own place within it.3 Ontological insecurity, in 
WXUQ VLJQLILHV ³WKH GHHS LQFDSDFLWDWLQJ VWDWH RI QRW NQRZLQJ KRZ WR JHW E\ LQ WKH ZRUOG´
(Mitzen and Schweller 2011, p. 29). With an explicit emphasis on uncertainty and anxiety as 
the key referents in ontological (in)security, this contribution seeks to complement the 
literature on the changing character of war by illuminating the disturbing ripple effect of hybrid 
warfare not only for the central security-political organisations of the West, but also for the 
ontological underpinnings of the International Relations (IR) discipline more generally.  
I propose to link the study of OS in IR systematically with the debates on hybrid warfare 
along ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions to provide sharpened analytical 
purchase for understanding the nature of, and the emerging Western responses to, the said 
challenge. OS perspective brings to the generally policy-centric study of hybrid threat 
management a systematic and conceptually rigorous understanding of the dual dynamic of 
anxiety (as a sense of unease and uncertainty), and routinised practices (as modes to confront 
anxiety in order to provide a stable cognitive environment) with important ethical and legal 
implications for conceptualising war (see Mitzen 2006, p. 346). My main argument is that 
³K\EULGZDUIDUH´ capsizes an embedded cognitive structure about what war is, thus defying 
attempts of organising life and social relations in a particular way, with fundamental 
consequences for the OS of the European Union (EU) and NATO. I proceed from the premise 
that defending and promoting a partiFXODUYLVLRQRIRQH¶VVHOILVLPSRUWDQWIRUWKH³VHFXULW\RI
EHLQJ´RIWKHVH:HVWHUQVHFXULW\-political institutions, and a prerequisite for the strategic use 
of their agency (Flockhart 2016, p. 801). This article offers an exploration of the EU and 
1$72¶V LGHQWLW\PDLQWHQDQFH³HVSHFLDOO\E\DFWLQJRUGRLQJWKLQJV´0LW]HQDQG6FKZHOOHU
                                                 
3
 The IR literature on OS is steadily expanding. For a recent special issue on the concept, see Cooperation and 
Conflict (2017), edited by Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, two of the key launchers of the notion in the 
discipline. For an authoritative book-length account, see Steele (2008). 
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2011, p. 28) vis-à-YLVK\EULGWKUHDWV,WWKXVVXEVFULEHVWR)ORFNKDUW¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHWZR
VWUDWHJLHVRI26PD[LPLVDWLRQD³VWUDWHJ\RIEHLQJ´DQGD³VWUDWHJ\RIGRLQJ´DUHLQWHUOLQNHG
and cannot be understood in isolation from one another (Flockhart 2016, p. 799; p. 816). 
What authority claims are the EU and NATO making about their ability and 
competence to handle K\EULGFKDOOHQJHVRUWKH³QHZW\SHRIZDUIDUH´"WhaWLVWKH³VHFXULW\
VWRU\´ these bodies articulate, accordingly? How are their respective attempts of countering 
³K\EULG WKUHDWV´ embedded in particular understandings of politics and war? What signs of 
discursive cross-pollination can we observe comparing the two organisations in their hybrid 
threat/warfare management strategies and practices? How does it all relate to their respective 
identity sustenance struggles? 
Below, I set out to show how the hybrid war discourse epitomises the contemporary 
ontological insecurities of the EU and NATO. Attempts to frame bold institutional responses 
WRWKH³K\EULG´WKUHDWVQRWDEO\YLDWKHSURPRWLRQRIUHVLOLHQFHDVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOHTXLYDOHQW
of a sense of OSPDUN³EULQJLQJWKHZDUEDFNLQ´IRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOsecurity management 
profiles of these two major Western organisDWLRQV1$72DQGWKH(8¶VHPHUJLQJGLVFRXUVH
and practice in countering hybrid warfare seek to prove their continuing relevance in the 
contemporary era. The preoccupation with hybrid threats has made the concept of war 
empirically more available for the EU. Albeit war continues to be normatively unacceptable, 
SXEOLFGLVFXVVLRQRIFRQFUHWHSUDFWLFHVWRFRXQWHUYDULRXV³K\EULG´PRYHVIURPWKLUGSDUWLHVDV
SDUWRIWKHEURDGHU³K\EULGZDUIDUH´FRXQWering paradigm is far from a taboo for the EU in this 
day and age.4 NATO as a more traditional security organisation is wrestling harder with the 
WKUHVKROGRIZDUEHFRPLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\IOXLGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI³K\EULG´HQJDJHPHQWV/DZ\HUV
GHEDWHZKHWKHU³K\EULGZDUIDUH´FDOOVIRUXSGDWHVLQWKHODZRIDUPHGFRQIOLFW8OWLPDWHO\LW
                                                 
4
 6HHIXUWKHU0LW]HQIRUWKHYDULRXVW\SHVRI³XQWKLQNDELOLWLHV´RIZDU  
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is the legal characterisation which determines whether a situation is considered to amount to 
DUPHG FRQIOLFW DQG DFFRUGLQJO\ ZKHWKHU SHDFHWLPH ODZ RU ODZ RI ZDU DSSOLHV 2¶&RQQell 
2015). The hybridisation of warfare further challenges the (substantively anyway dubious) 
legal distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts (Reeves 2016). 
0HDQZKLOHWKHJHQHUDODFFHSWDQFHRIWKHWHUP³K\EULGZDUIDUH´DOVR signals the politicisation 
of the established legal definition of war as a particular practice that takes place when certain 
specific conditions have been fulfilled.   
%UDQGLVKLQJ ³ZDU´ RQ SROLWLFDO FRQWHVWDWLRQV RI YDU\LQJ LQWHQVLW\ KDV IXUWKHUPRUH
ethical implications (cf. Franke 2015). As the EU and NATO are grappling with honing their 
response to the menaces and tactics combining a mixture of special forces, backdoor proxies, 
LQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQVDQG³GLJLWDOZDUIDUH´HJ,OYHVKDYLQJIXUWKer added the non-
VWDWHYDULDQWRIWKH³K\EULGWKUHDW´WRWKHPL[VXFKDV'DHVKDEURDGHUTXHVWLRQWUDQVSLUHV
about the repercussions of the alleged hybridisation of warfare and its perpetrators for the study 
of security in IR.  
The article proceeds in four sections. The first section gauges various definitions of 
hybrid warfare, outlines their relation to the notion of ontological insecurity, and the 
consequent countering attempts of hybrid threats to the mirror-image process of OS-seeking. I 
make a threefold proposition: hybrid warfare is disturbing ontologically, because it embodies 
the entanglement of politics and war in the contemporary era; epistemologically, because it 
unhinges the war/peace binary implicitly underpinning the IR discipline (Barkawi 2016);5 and 
last not least ethically, because the inherent danger of becoming a monster in the course of 
fighting monsters (aka the efficient countering of hybrid warfare) is particularly poignant for 
                                                 
5
 Yet, as Lupovici (2016) shows with his study of the idea and practices of deterrence, the ambiguity between 
peace and war is not invariably a source of ontological insecurity. Rather, as he argues, the ³GHWHUUHULGHQWLW\´ has 
been a major base of OS for the United States and Israel throughout the Cold War and after.  
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democratic polities (cf. Nietzsche 2004, Aphorism 146). The second section applies various 
OS-attuned lenses on the institutional responses of the EU and NATO to hybrid warfare, and 
the third section empirically illustrates the argument. The article concludes with a call for 
caution: DGRSWLQJWKH³HYHU\WKLQJLVGDQJHURXV´-approach further blurs the fuzzy line between 
politics and war, adding heat to the calls to revisit the international laws on armed conflicts (cf. 
Winter 2011). The justifiability of illiberal methods in safeguarding liberal values constitutes 
the crux of the OS dilemma for the Western security community battling the ³hybrid menace´. 
 
Hybrid Warfare as the Epitome of Ontological Insecurity 
 
Much of the strategic studies literature has been animated by the problem of uncertainty in 
international relations and, by extension, the consequences of uncertainty for the management 
RI VWDWHV¶ VHFXULW\ GLOHPPD (Rathbun 2007; cf. Mitzen and Schweller 2011). Ambiguity is 
likewise the original sin the ³K\EULG ZDUIDUH´-notion GUDZV RQ <HW WKH FRQFHSW ³K\EULG
ZDUIDUH´LVLWVHOIIDXOW\RIGHILQLWLRQDODPELJXLWLHVAlthough an increasingly utilised concept 
LQ WKHFRQWHPSRUDU\ VWUDWHJLFDQGSROLF\GLVFRXUVH³K\EULGZDUIDUH´ UHIHUV to a number of 
distinct phenomena, and consequently means different things to different people. It lacks a 
clear and uniform definition, hence embodying and perpetuating the countenance it seeks to 
FDSWXUH³+\EULGZDUIDUH´LVWKXVYLFWLPWRLWVRZQFRQFHStual plasticity (Tenenbaum 2015, p. 
43). 
The heterogeneous origins, composition, and use of the concept can be somewhat 
clarified by distinguishing between (i) hybrid threats (as complex and multidimensional 
modern menaces, crisscrossing multiple issue areas and amplifying one another); (ii) hybrid 
warfare (as a particular mode of waging war, combining conventional and unconventional, 
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coercive and non-coercive means, capabilities, tactics and formations in a centrally organised 
and orchestrated manner), and (iii) hybrid war DV ³D IRUP RI YLROHQW FRQIOLFW WKDW
simultaneously involves state and non-state actors, with the use of conventional and 
unconventional means of warfare that are not limited to the battlefield or a particular physical 
WHUULWRU\´-DFREVand Lasconjarias 2015, p. 3; cf. Jonsson and Seeley 2015; Browning 2002, 
p. 2). Tenenbaum (2015) offers a useful JHQHDORJ\ RI WKH ³K\EULG ZDUIDUH´ FRQFHSW, 
highlighting WKHQRWLRQ¶VGLVWLQFWHIIHFWVDWWKHSROLWLFDODQGVWUDWHJLFRSHUDWLRQDOWDFWLFDODQG 
capability levels. Yet, tKHSUDFWLFDOXVHRI WKH WHUP³K\EULG´KDV LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\DQGUDWKHU
confusingly moved between these different levels of analysis, seeking to capture the 
interconnected nature of modern vulnerabilities, the multiplicity of stakeholders in the 
contemporary security game (i.e. state and non-state actors, regular and irregular forces), along 
with the diversity and simultaneity of conventional and unconventional means used, ranging 
from military, political, economic, diplomatic, technological to criminal modes of engagement 
(Hoffman 2007; Glenn 2009; Pawlak 2015). Writings on hybrid warfare thus tap into both the 
literature on asymmetric/counterinsurgency warfare (McCuen 2008; cf. Winter 2011) and that 
on interstate wars (Gerasimov 20131RZRQGHUWKDW³K\EULG´KDVFRPHWRDFFRPPRGDWHDV
YDULHGSKHQRPHQDDV5XVVLD¶VWDNHRYHURI&ULPHDLQDQGLWVLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHRQJRLQJ
FRQIOLFWLQHDVWHUQ8NUDLQH5XVVLD¶VPHGGOLQJLQWKHHOHFWLRQVRIYDULRXVFRXQWULHVDURXQGWKH
world via sophisticated phishing, doxing, and fake news campaigns, and the regional and global 
operating logics of politically ambitious non-state organisations, such as Hezbollah, Boko 
Haram, Al-Qaeda, or Daesh, or even criminal structures (e.g., the drug cartels in Mexico; see 
further Tenenbaum 2015). 
Drawing on the emerging scholarship on hybrid warfare, three core interconnections 
can be flagged between hybrid warfare (as an empirical phenomenon and a discursive trope) 
and (the study of) OS in IR. First, along the ontological dimension³K\EULGZDUIDUH´FDSWXUHV
 8 
the increasing porousness of lines between politics and war in the contemporary era, thus 
defying the attempts of organising life and social relations in a particular way (cf. Huysmans 
1998). While many critics of the notion maintain that hybrid warfare remains just another 
variation on the old Clausewitzian understanding of war as the continuation of politics with a 
mixture of other means (cf. Gray 2007), others nonetheless highlight the particularity of the 
contemporary hybrid engagements. For the scholars finding distinct added value in the notion, 
the calibration and central coordination of the convergence of the various regular and irregular 
elements, further amplified by the new technological vulnerabilities and capabilities in 
contemporary hybrid engagements, have made the creeping indeterminacy about what war 
exactly is and how to go about it in the present day only more intense. The envisioning of 
hybrid engagements as a pre-phase of a full-scale military attack further adds to the ambiguity 
between the boundaries of warfare as essentially organised, reciprocal fighting and politics as 
a peaceful space of ordinary goings-about.  
For those at the receiving end, hybrid warfare emerges as an epitome of ontological 
inVHFXULW\UHIHUULQJWRWKH³deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront 
DQGZKLFKWRLJQRUH LHKRZWRJHWE\LQ WKHZRUOG´0LW]HQ006, p. 345). It is an urgent 
reminder of the chameleon-like character of war ± WKDWLVZDU¶VWHQGHQF\WRconstantly change 
its forms as well as its appearances (Clausewitz 1976, p. 80). At the most fundamental level, 
then, hybrid warfare epitomises the blurry line between politics and war. It also symbolises the 
struggle for, and fear over losiQJ FRQWURO ³over the ends, ways and means of nations, 
FRPPXQLWLHV DQG VRFLHWLHV´ (Palmer 2015, S  $VVXPLQJ WKDW FROOHFWLYLWLHV¶ DJHQF\ LV
predicated on identification and routinisation (Greve 2017, p. 7), uncertainty about the nature 
of external threats does not just generate physical insecurity but also evokes ontological 
insecurity for the institutions (such as military) and organisations in question. Hybrid warfare 
exposes collective actors to the fundamental existential questions about the continuity of their 
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external environment as they know it and their own finitude, with the related anxiety about the 
difficulties of concretising unknown and indeterminate threats (cf. Ejdus 2017). Thus 
formulated, hybrid warfare directly tarJHWVDFWRUV¶³VHFXULW\RIEHLQJ´ (Kinnvall 2004, p. 746), 
disturbing the stability of their sense-making attempts of the surrounding world and the events 
they are faced with, and threatening to unsettle the established institutionalised routines. 
,QVWHDG K\EULG ZDUIDUH LWVHOI HPHUJHV DV DQ ³LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI GRXEW´ SURYRNLQJ
considerable ontological insecurity (cf. Giddens 1990, pp. 92-94). 
Epistemologically, and on a second note, ³K\EULGZDUIDUH´WKXVVLJQLILFDQWO\XQVHWWOHV
WKH³ZDUSHDFHELQDU\´ZKLFKKDVDUJXDEO\VWUXFWXUHGWhe thinking about, and categorisation 
of, war in the Eurocentric tradition of its study. This particular understanding of war(time), 
cleanly juxtaposed to peace(time) has been attuned to the needs of an international system of 
sovereign nation-states, enabling the consequent categorisation of war into international (inter-
state) and civil (intra-VWDWHZDU%DUNDZL³+\EULGZDUV´HPSKDWLFDOO\FKDOOHQJH a neat 
war/peace binary, which has, however, served as a core source of OS for the discipline of IR. 
7KHUH LV D IDPLO\ UHVHPEODQFHEHWZHHQ WKHFRQFHSWVRI³K\EULGZDUIDUH´DQG WKHQRWLRQRI
³XQSHDFH´ LQWURGXFHG E\ .HOOR  VHHNLQJ WR FDSWXUH WKH DPELguous, yet persistent 
irritants by virtual weapons on the international order.  
Finally, hybrid warfare meets OS at the intersection of ethical security studies 
(Browning 2016; Browning and McDonald 2011). Just as OS-seeking practices need to be 
analysed with an eye on the ethical conundrums and dilemmas they might give rise to due to 
the exercise of power along the way (e.g., Mälksoo 2015; Rossdale 2015WKH³VRFLDO WXUQ´
accompanying the hybridisation of warfare in various empirical settings, and the consequent 
countering attempts of hybrid warfare, require equally intent ethical attention (see Owens 
2012,IK\EULGFRQIOLFWVDUHXQGHUVWRRGDV³IXOOVSHFWUXPZDUV«FRPELQLQJDVWUXJJOHDJDLQVW
an armed enemy and a wider struggle for, control and support of WKHFRPEDW]RQH¶VLQGLJHQRXV
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population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´0F&XHQp. 108), hybrid warfare really appears as yet another 
variation on the theme of ³ZDUDPRQJVWthe people´. The intermingling of political and military 
activities thus not only underscores the need for their parallel examination (Smith 2005), but 
also calls for caution in the lax use of war as a metaphor for engagements of various types and 
intensity. If society must be defended (Foucault 1976) against nearly everything, at all times, 
DQGLIHYHU\RQHEHFRPHVFRQQHFWHGDQGSRWHQWLDOO\WDUJHWHGLQWKHJOREDO³K\EULGZDU´]RQH
what is left of politics, and the delicate balancing act between security and democratic liberties? 
The implications of constant public perception management in the service of protecting the 
IUHHGRP RI VSHHFK LQ WKH ³SRVW-WUXWK´ ZRUOG are perhaps not fully fathomable yet. The 
disconcerting potential of the increasingly prominent strategic communication discourse in the 
EU6 and NATO7 for the everyday of democratic politics is already evident (cf. Garton Ash 
2016). Securing a core democratic value ± freedom of speech/freedom of media ± via obsessive 
emphasis on proactive and purposeful communication management points at the classic 
paradox of militant democracy whereby the very attempt to defend democracy might 




                                                 
6
 I.e., defending ³WKH(8LWV0HPEHU6WDWHVDQGFLWL]HQV´IURPWKH³GLVLQIRUPDWLRQDQGPLVLQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQV
and propaJDQGD´(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW). 
7
 1$72¶V 6WUDVERXUJKehl SummiW GHFODUDWLRQ  PDLQWDLQV WKDW ³LW LV LQFUHDVLQJO\ LPSRUWDQW WKDW WKH
Alliance communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives 
and missions. Strategic communications are an integral part of our HIIRUWVWRDFKLHYHWKH$OOLDQFH¶VSROLWLFDODQG
PLOLWDU\REMHFWLYHV´ 
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Managing Hybrid Warfare as Ontological Security-Seeking  
 
Hybrid warfare emerges as the embodiment of uncertainty for the EU and NATO. The 
meanings of uncertainty range from fear, ignorance, confusion, and/or indeterminacy in IR 
theory (Rathbun 2007, pp. 533-534). It is certainly possible to apply all these lenses and 
consequent emphases on reading the EU and NATO responses to the fundamentally 
undetermined condition of hybrid warfare, ambivalence par excellence. Paraphrasing 
+X\VPDQV¶V  RULJLQDO DSSOLFDWLRQ RI the OS concept in IR, the Western countering 
attempts of hybrid warfare tell a security story wherein a fear of uncertainty, or of the unknown 
trumps a more concrete fear of death at the hands of other people. As hybrid warfare vividly 
symbolisHV³DQHSLVWHPRORJLFDOIHDU± DIHDURIQRWNQRZLQJ´+X\VPDQVp. 235) (e.g., 
ZKHQZDULVZDJHGDW³XV´ZKDWLVWKLV³QHZ´NLQGRI³ZDU´UHDOO\DOODERXWHWFWKHHPHUJLQJ
strategic responses of these two core Western organisations demonstrate how the double fear 
of death and not knowing quite when and in which ways to expect it, gets objectified in order 
to make the growing list of potentially existentially dangerous subjects and phenomena more 
FRQFUHWHSDOSDEOHDQGFRQFHLYDEOHIRURQHVHOI+\EULGZDUIDUHWKXVHPHUJHVDVWKH³XQEHDUDEOH
YRLG´+X\VPDQVp. 237), which needs WREHREMHFWLILHGLQRUGHUWREHFRPH³NQRZDEOH´
and (more) tolerable. 
Huysmans (1998) defines OS as a strategy for managing the limits of reflexivity by 
fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order. In his interpretation, OS thus 
conceUQV WKH JHQHUDO TXHVWLRQ RI WKH SROLWLFDO RU ³KRZ WR RUGHU VRFLDO UHODWLRQV ZKLOH
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ JXDUDQWHHLQJ WKHYHU\ DFWLYLW\RIRUGHULQJ LWVHOI´ Huysmans 1998, p. 242). 
Hybrid warfare, by definition, destabilises the traditional cognitive security environment of 
states and international organisations, and consequently, renders their identity insecure. 
&UDIWLQJ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHVSRQVHV WRK\EULGZDUIDUH WKXVEHFRPHVD ³GUHDGPDQDJHPHQW´
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exercise wherein daily security administration attempts, seeking to objectify the abstract fear 
of death through constructing concrete enemies and thus introducing a level of certainty, 
nonetheless remain toothless DW WKH LQDELOLW\ WR ³KLHUDUFKL]H WKUHDWV´ LQ DQ DWPRVSKHUH RI
potentially permanent state of crisis and urgency (Huysmans 1998, p. 243). The pursuits of 
daily security and OS ³VHFXULW\RIEHLQJ´WKXVFROODSVHLQWRHDFKRWKHU 
Hybrid warfare indicates a multitude of possible contingencies, generating anxiety 
about onH¶VDELOLW\WRUHPDLQRQHVHOIDQGWRFRQWLQXHWRDFWIt is thus OLQNHGWR³anxiety over 
the vulnerability of [Western] power´ (Bell 2012, pp. 230-231), threatening the West about 
losing its particularistic form of existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 455). Anxiety, in contrast to 
fear, which per Giddens (1991, p. 43) constitutes a response to a specific threat, concerns 
³SHUFHLYHGWKUHDWVWRWKHLQWHJULW\RIWKHVHFXULW\V\VWHPRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO´Giddens 1991, pp. 
44-45; cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 38; Rumelili 2015). OS-seeking aims to mitigate 
the effects of such hard uncertainty, bringing it within bearable limits (Mitzen 2006, p. 346). 
5RXWLQHV DUH LQVWUXPHQWDO KHUH DV WKH\ ³SDFLI\ WKH FRJQLWLYH HQYLURQPHQW«µLQRFXODWLQJ¶ 
individuals against paralytic, deep fear of chaos´ (Mitzen 2006, p. 347). 
%HLQJDEOHWRVXUYLYHWKH³K\EULGWKUHDWV´LVGLUHFWO\SHUWLQHQWWRWKHVXUYLYDORIWKH(8
and NATO as particular kinds of organisations, underpinned and driven by specific values ± 
which cannot be sacrificed or diluted in the struggle for physical and institutional survival. Yet, 
hybrid warfare disturbs the OS of the EU and NATO in subtly distinct ways. Due to the 
particularities of their institutional set-ups and historical foundations, the OS drives of the two 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV DUH VRPHZKDW GLVWLQFWLYH 1$72¶V KLVWRU\ LV RFFDVLRQDOO\ WROG WKURXJK LWV
surpassing of a sequence of crises, albeit the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its original 
enemy created a situation of unprecedented uncertainty and ontological insecurity for the 
$OOLDQFH0HDQZKLOHWKH(8¶VRQWRORJLFDOLQVHFXULW\LVDPRUHUHFHQWSKHQRPHQRQVWHPPLQJ
 13 
mostly from the Eurocrisis and the looming possibility of a Grexit a few years ago; the 
refugee/migration crisis in Europe of 2015 (Dingott Alkhoper; Mitzen in this issue); the actual 
UK decision on Brexit in 2016 (Browning in this issue); and the rise of populist politics within 
the EU (Introduction to this special issue) and the United States. NATO as a military alliance 
has been historically more accustomed to the othering practices of concrete geographical 
places, whereas the EU is generally regarded as an organisation that has risen above 
geopolitical othering, juxtaposing itVHOIWR(XURSH¶VGDUNSDVWLQVWHDG5XPHOLOL6XERWLF, and 
Della Sala in this issue). Accordingly, the EU might be more at home with hybrid threat 
management due to its historically broader conceptualisation of security through the paradigm 
RILQWHUWZLQHGULVNVUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJIRFXVHGPRUHVWULFWO\RQ³WKH threat, use and control of 
PLOLWDU\IRUFH´LQ WKHPDQQHURID WUDGLWLRQDOGHIHQFHDOOLDQFH:DOWS0DQQHUV
 5HJDUGOHVV RI LWV SHUSHWXDO WUDQVIRUPHU¶V VHOI-image, hybrid threats represent the 
XQFRPIRUWDEOH³KDUG´RU³IXQGDPHQWDO´XQFHUWDLnty for NATO (Knight 1971(1921); Ellsberg 
1961 through Mitzen 2006, p. 346) and are thus ontologically disturbing for the security of its 
VHOIDVDWUDGLWLRQDODOOLDQFHZLWKDFROOHFWLYHVHFXULW\SOHGJHERXQGWR³DUPHGDWWDFN´DJDLQVW
one or more of its member states.  
In order to achieve OS, DFWRUV VWULYH IRU ³routinizing their relations with significant 
RWKHUV´Mitzen 2006, p. 342). Routines help to keep ontological fears at bay, out of everyday 
discursive consciousness (Mitzen 2006, p. 348). From this pHUVSHFWLYH1$72¶VQDPLQJDQG
shaming strategy vis-à-vis Russia as part of its hybrid warfare countering strategy links the 
uncertainty emanating from the hybrid nature of the new threats to the known and routine 
relationship with its traditional antagonist.8 The incapacitating difficulties related to planning 
                                                 
8
 6HH6SHUOLQJDQG:HEEHUIRUDFRPSUHKHQVLYHWDNHRQ1$72¶VUHVHFXULWLVDWLRQof Russia in connection 
with the Ukraine crisis. 
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ahead in anticipating and countering hybrid engagements are thus somewhat alleviated by the 
ODWWHU¶VDWWDFKPHQWWRDNQRZQULYDO5XVVLD¶VK\EULGLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ8NUDLQHKDVFRQFXUUHQWO\
provided NATO ZLWKWKHIDPLOLDUSDUDPHWHUVRI WKHFRJQLWLYH³FRFRRQ´*LGGHQVpp. 
39-40) which enables the alliance to reproduce its cognitively ³NQRZDEOH´ZRUOG$0LW]HQLDQ
UHDGLQJRI1$72¶VHPHUJLQJUHVSRQVH WRK\EULG WKUHDWVZDUIDUH WKXs points at the renewed 
routinisDWLRQ RI WKH ³SURJUDPPHG FRJQLWLYH DQG EHKDYLRUDO UHVSRQVHV´ WR 5XVVLD DV WKH
DOOLDQFH¶VRULJLQDOQHPHVLV 
Restoring traditional vigilance vis-à-vis Russia, buttressing the forward defence along 
WKH$OOLDQFH¶VHDVWHUQIODQNZLWKWKHUHVSHFWLYHPLlitary reinforcements, contingency planning 
and exercises, the emerging response of NATO to the hybrid menace could also be read as an 
attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North Atlantic Alliance. Hybrid 
warfare endangers the basic features of the said normative order (or that of the broadly 
conceived Western security community in general, including the EU as well) as its efficient 
FRXQWHULQJZRXOGOLNHO\FRPSURPLVHWKHXQGHUO\LQJSULQFLSOHVIRUWKLVRUGHU¶VSDUWLFXODULVWLF
existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 450). As a threat of subversion, hybrid warfare exposes the 
internal vulnerabilities in the body of the traditional security alliance (NATO) and a self-
proclaimed post-modern security actor (i.e. the EU; cf. Cooper 2004). This concerns, in 
particular, the ever-elusive (and contested) balance between national/organisational security 
and individual liberties (cf. Waldron 2003; Neocleous 2007), as strategic communication is 
inherently at odds with free speech as a core value of Western liberalism. Countering hybrid 
warfare is conducive of generating a security predicament of perpetual pre-emption which, by 
definition, would indicate pre-emptive gathering of all sorts of data, thus likely infringing on 
the privacy of the individuals for the sake of the organisational/regional/national security. This 
precautionary logic resonates with the risk society approach which characterises the struggling 
with a sheer volume of risks with potentially fundamental consequences as a key feature of 
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modernity, LPSO\LQJ WKDW ³GHFLVLRQV DUH«PDGH QRW LQ FRQWH[W RI FHUWDLQW\ QRU HYHQ RI
available knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, challenge, mistrust, fear, and 
DQ[LHW\´ (Ewald 2002, p. 294).  
$OHVVV\PSDWKHWLFUHDGLQJRIVXFKRQWRORJLFDO³GUHDGPDQDJHPHQW´H[HUFLVHZRXOG
regard particularly 1$72¶V HPHUJLQJ QDUUDWLYH DQG SUDFWLFH DERXW K\EULG ZDUIDUH DV DQ
H[DPSOHRIWXUQLQJXQNQRZQDQ[LHWLHVLQWR³WKHmanageable certainties of objects of fear to 
SK\VLFDOVHFXULW\WKURXJKVHFXULWL]DWLRQ´%URZQLQJDQG-RHQQLHPLS5XPHOLOL
Steele 2008, p. 64). 1$72¶VDQGWKH(8¶V³GUHDGPDQDJHPHQW´VWUDWHJLHVYLV-à-vis the hybrid 
³VSHFWHU´ tune us further in the direction of Croft and Vaughan-WilOLDPV¶V  p. 27) 
UHVHDUFKDJHQGDDVNLQJVSHFLILFDOO\³>Z@KRVHGUHDGLVPDQDJHGDQGDWZKDWFRVWIRUZKRP"´, 
thus illuminating the ethical pitfalls related to their OS-seeking. Due to the omnipresence and 
ambivalence of hybrid threats, NATO and the EU¶VFRXQWHULQJVWUDWHJLHVRIK\EULGZDUIDUH
YHUJHRQ³GHHSVHFXULWL]DWLRQ´, which Abulof (2014, p. 397) defines by its distinctly high scale 
and scope of securitising moves. The hybrid warfare discourse has become ubiquitous in the 
respective repertoires of the EU and NATO, with hybrid threats framed as imminent, 
protracted, and existentially endangering. Securitisation thus emerges as a response to the 
RQWRORJLFDOLQVHFXULW\ZLWKDSURPLVHRI³PLWLJDWLQJWKHH[LVWHQWLDODQJVWDULVLQJIURPGHDWK
being both FHUWDLQDQGXQGHWHUPLQHG´$EXORIp. 403; Huysmans 1998). Both NATO 
and the EU are engaged in collective securitisation of hybrid warfare since the threat in question 
has a systemic referent ± WKDWLVLW³LPSLQJ>HV@XSRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGFROOHFWLYH identities, or 
WKH UXOHV DQG QRUPV JRYHUQLQJ LQWHUVWDWH LQWHUDFWLRQV´ 6SHUOLQJ DQG :HEEHU  S 
Hybrid threat management by the EU and NATO could accordingly be understood as the 
institutionalisation of their respective organisational OS-seeking YLD VWUDWHJLHV RI ³EHLQJ´
(aimed at constructing a strong narrative to buttress a continuous and esteem-boosting identity) 
DQG ³GRLQJ´ IRFXVHG RQ DQ DWWHPSW WR XSKROG D VWDEOH FRJQLWLYH HQYLURQPHQW WKURXJK
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URXWLQLVHG SUDFWLFH ³ZKLOVW also undertaking action contributing to a sense of integrity and 
SULGH´ (Flockhart 2016, p. 799). While the EU is emphatically defending core democratic 
values (freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, media freedom and access to information) 
(European Parliament 2016), NA72¶V FRXQWHULQJ RI K\EULG WKUHDWV GHPRQVWUDWHV PRUH
explicitly the intertwining of its physical survival as an efficient political-military alliance and 
a sense of OS as the principal warden of the European security (and more broadly Western 
world) order. 7KHLQDELOLW\WRKRQRXUWKHFROOHFWLYHGHIHQFHSOHGJHZRXOGEHDEORZDW1$72¶V
identity and PHDQLWVDOPRVWFHUWDLQGHDWK7KHVHFXULW\RILWV³ERG\´LHSK\VLFDOVHFXULW\
DQG³VHOI´LHRQWRORJLFDOLGHQWLW\VHFXULW\DUHWKHUHIRUHOHVVGLVWLQJXLVKable than in case of 
the EU which is a far more complex political setting, with only relatively recent claims (albeit 
with increasing assertiveness) in the traditional security sphere.9 Regardless, for both 
organisations, countering hybrid threats serves as a reactive self-legitimation as they thus 
reassert their relevance and ability to be of assistance for their respective member states and 
populations. 
 
Hybrid Warfare in Daily Security Management 
 
A ELUG¶V-eye view of the EU and NATO¶V emerging management strategies of hybrid warfare 
demonstrates how the looming hybrid agenda is directly tapping into the everyday security 
concerns of these two main Western political and security organisations. 
                                                 
9
 Note that the EU is currently considering the DSSOLFDELOLW\RILWVVROLGDULW\FODXVH$UWLFOH7)(8³in case a 
wide-UDQJLQJDQGVHULRXVK\EULGDWWDFNRFFXUV´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ 
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In NAT2DQGWKH(8¶VUHVSRQVHVWRhybrid threats, OS HPHUJHVDVWKHDFWRU¶VDELOLW\
to tolerate, and cope with change (Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 32). Albeit seemingly 
counterintuitive due to the general human preference for stability over change, OS might 
nonetheless ³GHULYH>@IURPconstructive attempts to (re)create and consolidate collective self-
LGHQWLWLHV´ 9LHLUD  p. 292). The leitmotif of adapting to changing circumstances is 
UHIOHFWHGLQERWKWKH(8DQG1$72¶VQRWDEOHHPSKDVHVRQUHVLOLHQFH ± which, I argue, could 
be regarded as an institutional alias for their positive sense of self, and by consequence a 
IXQFWLRQDOHTXLYDOHQWRI WKHVHDFWRUV¶26 Rendered DV³WKHDELOLW\RIVWDWHVDQGVRFLHWLHVWR
UHIRUP WKXV ZLWKVWDQGLQJ DQG UHFRYHULQJ IURP LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO FULVLV´ :DJQHU DQG
Anholt 2016, p. 414)³UHVLOLHQFH´PDQLIHVWVDFODLPRQDVHQVHRILQVWLWXWLRQDOself-worth and 
UHOHYDQFHDPLGVWGHHSXQFHUWDLQW\,QYRNLQJ³UHVLOLHQFH´DSSHDUVHPSKDWLFDOO\DVDQDQ[LHW\
management rather than avoidance exercise, at relatively low ontological costs involved for 
the actors concerned. Resilience is thus conceptually linked, yet not synonymous with OS: it 
functions as an imperfect solution to the perennial ontological insecurity problem ± for OS 
remains always to be measured in degrees, rather than being categorically achievable in 
practice. As a notoriously flexible notion, politically convenient and intellectually perplexing 
LQHTXDOGRVHVUHVLOLHQFHUHIHUVWR³WKHSURFHVVRIVHHNLQJWRPDLQWDLQWKHVWDWXVTXRLQWKHIDFH
of shocks, but it also refers [to] the idea of transforming a referent REMHFW´%RXUEHDXDQG5\DQ
2018, p. 223).  
AdDSWDELOLW\RU WKHDELOLW\ WRFRSHZLWKFKDQJHKDVEHHQ WKHNH\ WURSH LQ1$72¶V
discursive self-presentation throughout the post-Cold War era (Barany and Rauchhaus 2011). 
Likewise, the EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy (2016) demonstrates the 
8QLRQ¶V VKLIW LQ HPSKDVLVing ³resilience´ over more progressive foreign policy goals, as 
reflected in the earlier, 2003 EU Security Strategy (Mälksoo 2016; Wagner and Anholt 2016; 
Juncos 2017). 1$72 DQG WKH (8¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO HPSKDVLV RQ UHVLOLHQFH FDSWXUHV WKH
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SDUDGR[LFDOG\QDPLFRIWKH³VWUDWHJ\RIGRLQJ´LQWKHLU26PD[LPLVDWLRQDWWHPSWVFRPELQLQJ
a continuous struggle to manage emergent change by routinised practices, yet also 
demonstrating ability to undertake action to tackle transformative change (see Flockhart 2016, 
p. 816). For what it is worth, ³resilience´ functions as a symbolic codename for the EU and 
1$72¶V LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHVSRQVHV WR WKH GHHSO\ XQVHWtling ontological insecurity condition 
evoked by hybrid threats/warfare. It captures WKHQHFHVVDULO\³K\EULG´GHIHQFe to effectively 
counter the menace in question, including such non-traditional issues as social and political 
cohesion, vigilance about the funding sources of domestic political parties, and legitimate and 
effective governance in its spectrum of security (Galeotti 2015, 2016a). Countering hybrid 
WKUHDWV E\ SURSSLQJ WKH (8 DQG 1$72¶V UHVLOLHQFH LQ YDULRXV DUHDV UDQJLQJ IURP FULWLFDO
infrastructure, energy and cyber security to transport, financial system and society as a whole) 
HQDEOHV D KRVW RI FODLPV RQ WKH SHUWLQHQW SROLWLHV¶ YLDELOLW\ DELOLW\ WR DGMXVW WR WKH TXLFNO\
changing demands of the modern world, ownership of the contemporary security scene, and 
last but not least a workable partnership between the two organisations. 8QGHUVWRRG ³Ds a 
preventive and deterrent action to solidify societies and avoid escalation of crises both within 
DQGRXWVLGHWKH(8´(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQUHVLOience, and the calls to strengthen it, 
put the main responsibility to the respective member states and their populace, but notably also 
partner countries in neighbourhood regions (European Commission and High Representative 
2017). The vernacular targets of hybrid threats thus become the main stakeholders in the OS 
management pursuits of theVH:HVWHUQRUJDQLVDWLRQVHIIHFWLYHO\HQDEOLQJWKH(8DQG1$72¶V
evasion of responsibility under the banner of sought OS provision. 
 
The EU 
,QWKH(8¶VRIILFLDOGLVFRXUVH³K\EULG´IXQFWLRQVDVDFDWFK-all umbrella term, enabling to join 
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concerns about and the related resilience-building activLWLHVDJDLQVW ,VODPLF³UDGLFDOLVDWLRQ´
DQG³YLROHQWH[WUHPLVP´ZLWKOHVVRQVOHDUQHGIURPWKH5XVVLDQDctions in Ukraine in recent 
years. 7KHWZROHLWPRWLIVRIWKH(8¶VGLVFRXUVHDQGHPHUJLQJSUDFWLFHRQFRXQWHULQJ³K\EULG
WKUHDWV´UHODWHWRVWUDWHJLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQDQGUHVLOLHQFHZLWKSUHYHQWLRQFULVLVUHVSRQVHDQG
recovering acting as supplementary goalV ³5HVLOLHQFH´ LV GHILQHG LQ WKH 8QLRQ¶V -RLQW
)UDPHZRUN RQ FRXQWHULQJ K\EULG WKUHDWV DV ³WKH FDSDFLW\ WR ZLWKVWDQG VWUHVV DQG UHFRYHU
strengthened from challenges´ (EU 2016, p.  7KLV)UDPHZRUN LV GHVLJQHG WR ³IRVWHU WKH
resilience of the EU and MembeU6WDWHVDVZHOODVSDUWQHUV´(8p. 2). The document 
GHILQHVK\EULGWKUHDWVDV³WKHPL[WXUHRIFRHUFLYHDQGVXEYHUVLYHDFWLYLW\FRQYHQWLRQDODQG
unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be 
used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while 
UHPDLQLQJEHORZWKHWKUHVKROGRIIRUPDOO\GHFODUHGZDUIDUH´EU 2016, p. 2). The Framework 
thus refrains from explicitly using WKH QRWLRQ ³K\EULG ZDUIDUH´, discussing instead the 
DSSURSULDWH UHVSRQVH WR ³K\EULG WKUHDWV´ LQ WKH IUDPHZRUN RI WKH (8¶V FULVLV PDQDJHPHQW
PXWXDOVROLGDULW\FODXVHWKH&RPPRQ6HFXULW\DQG'HIHQFH3ROLF\&6'3DQGLQWKH8QLRQ¶V
cooperation with NATO (but cf. EEAS(2015) 731, point 6, p. 2). The avoidance of the explicit 
³ZDUIDUH´ WURSH LQ WKH (8¶V SROLF\ IUDPHZRUN LV DOVR HYRFDWLYH RI WKH 8QLRQ¶V DWWHPSW WR
sustain the basic continuity with its foundational self-narrative as an antipode to war. It is 
IXUWKHUV\PSWRPDWLFRIWKH(8¶VWHQGHQF\WRDSSUoach conflict from the perspective of crisis 
management. 
The EU puts primary responsibility in countering hybrid threats to its member states, 
³DV PRVW QDWLRQDO YXOQHUDELOLWLHV DUH FRXQWU\-VSHFLILF´ EU 2016, p. 2). Its own role is 
envisioned for a coordinDWHG UHVSRQVH LQ RUGHU ³WR EXLOG RQ (XURSHDQ VROLGDULW\ PXWXDO
DVVLVWDQFHDQGWKHIXOOSRWHQWLDORIWKH/LVERQ7UHDW\´EU 2016, p. 27KH(8¶V³NH\YDOXH-
DGGLQJ UROH´ LV DFFRUGLQJO\ GHHPHG WR OLH LQ ³EXLOGLQJ DZDUHQHVV´ EU 2016, p. 2). The 
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ambition to gain epistemological control over the hybrid threats spectrum via awareness-
raising LVVXSSRVHG³WRLPSURYHWKHUHVLOLHQFHRI0HPEHU6WDWHVWRUHVSRQGWRFRPPRQWKUHDWV´ 
in turn (EU 2016, p. 2). The resilience-building effort includes the protection of critical 
infrastructure; adapting and developing necessary defence capabilities; protecting public health 
and food security; improving cybersecurity in various spheres; targeting hybrid threat 
financing; countering radicalisation and violent extremism; increasing cooperation with third 
countries (EU 2016, pp. 5-15). A sound strategic communication strategy, making full use of 
ERWKWKHQHZDQGROGPHGLDWRROVLVDFRUHQHFHVVLW\RXWOLQHGLQWKH)UDPHZRUNIRU³>S@URYLGLQJ
swift factual responses and raising public awareness about hybrid threats are major factors for 
EXLOGLQJVRFLHWDOUHVLOLHQFH´SS-7KH(8VHWXSWKH(($6¶V(DVW6WUDW&RP7DVN)RUFH
following the European Council in March 2015, which tasked the High Representative to 
submit (in cooperation with the EU institutions and member states) an action plan on strategic 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQWRSXUSRVHIXOO\FRXQWHU5XVVLD¶VGLVLQIRUPDWLRQFDPSDLJQV7KH7DVN)RUFH
cooperates with the so-called myth-busting network of experts and NGOs in over 30 countries, 
reporting disinformation instances to the Task Force.10 
7KH(8WKXVPRVWO\VHHVLWVUROHLQ³FUHDWLQJV\QHUJLHVEHWZHHQDOOUHOHYDQWLQVWUXPHQWV
and fostering close cooperation between all relevant actors´, capitalising on the existing (or at 
the time of the )UDPHZRUN¶VDGRSWLRQVWLOOXSFRPLQJWRROVVXFKDVWKH(XURSHDQ$JHQGDRQ
Security, the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy and European Defence Action 
Plan, the EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the Energy Security Strategy, and the EU Maritime 
Security Strategy (EU 2016, p. 7KH8QLRQ¶VPDLQLQVWLWXWLRQDODQVZHUWRWKHNH\WDVNRI




115_stratcom-east_qanda_en.htm (accessed 5 April 2018). The EU Mythbusters are available on Twitter at 
https://twitter.com/EUvsDisinfo (accessed 5 April 2018). 
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enhancing awareness about hybrid threats by monitoring and evaluating the risks potentially 
targeting EU vulnerabilities is the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, established within the EU 
Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). The Fusion Cell is tasked to monitor and analysH WKH ³H[WHUQDO DVSHFWV RI K\EULG
WKUHDWVDIIHFWLQJWKH(8DQGLWVQHLJKERXUKRRG´EU 2016, p. 4), along with providing inputs 
to the security risk assessments carried out at the EU level. However, the Fusion Cell is not 
foreseen to offer policy recommendations or engage in strategic level research or capacity-
building (via providing exercise or training) in countering hybrid threats. These functions are 
intended to be fulfilled by the recently established Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid 
Threats in Finland, which is open to both EU and NATO members (Finnish Government 2017). 
As per organisational reflex, the EU foresees a significant opportunity to reinvigorate the 
practical cooperation with NATO in their respective attempts to counter hybrid threats in the 
spheres of situational awareness, strategic communications, cybersecurity, and crisis 
prevention and response.11 The new international Centre of Excellence is envisaged to be the 
pinnacle of this long-awaited cooperation. While designed to function outside regular EU and 
NATO structures as a multi-national network of sorts, this institution logically supplements the 
existing NATO Centres of Excellence on cyber defence in Tallinn, Estonia; strategic 
communications in Riga, Latvia, and energy security in Vilnius, Lithuania.12  
                                                 
11
 See also http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_131283.htm (accessed 5 April 2018). 
12
 Notably, Finland is not a member of NATO, so locating the new Centre there illustrates the purposeful bridge-
building attempts of the two organisations in countering the hybrid menace together. The current members of the 
Centre are Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, France, Germany, the United States, 





³+\EULG ZDUIDUH´ has emerged DV \HW DQRWKHU ³UHVLOLHQFH WHVW´ (Stoltenberg 2015a) for the 
Alliance in its post-Cold War existential search for a new purpose and mission. Moreover, the 
hybrid insecurity predicament enables the allies to bring together the renewed focus on 
1$72¶V WUDGLWLRQDOPLVVLRQ LH HQGRUVLQJFROOHFWLYe defence in order to counter the main 
JHRSROLWLFDOFRQWHVWDQWRIWKH1RUWK$WODQWLF$OOLDQFHLQ(XURSHDQGWKH$OOLDQFH¶VSRVW-Cold 




across the D,0(),/ VSHFWUXP´ LH GLSORPDWLFSROLWLFDO LQIRUPDWLRQ PLOLWDU\ HFRQRPLF








Countering hybrid threats posed by Russia and the Islamic radicals threatening the 
territories, populations, interests, and values of the Alliance thus enables NATO to endorse its 
continuing relevance by constructing a strong narrative and maintaining its OS as the core 
security guarantor for its members (cf. Flockhart 2012, pp. 78-79). The softer, partnership-
geared, or so-FDOOHG³-DQH´QDUUDWLYHRIWKHHDUO\-post Cold War NATO is clearly giving way 
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to a more familiar, hard security-focused ³7DU]DQ´VHOI-vision and public representation (see 
IXUWKHU)ORFNKDUW&DOOLQJWKHNHWWOHEODFNLVWKHOHDVWRI1$72¶VZRUULHV5XVVLD¶VXVH
RI³proxy soldiers, unmarked Special Forces, intimidation and propaganda, all to lay a thick 
fog of confusion; to obscure its true SXUSRVHLQ8NUDLQHDQGWRDWWHPSWGHQLDELOLW\´LVH[SOLFLWO\
GLVVHFWHGLQRXWOLQLQJ1$72¶VHPHUJLQJFRXQWHU-strategy to hybrid engagements of the sort 
(Stoltenberg 2015a). <HWMXVWWKHWUDGLWLRQDOVHWRI1$72¶VFDSDELOLWLHVLVFOHDUO\GHHPHGWR
be insufficient in the face of, inter alia ³VRSKLVWLFDted disinformation and radicalization 
FDPSDLJQV´6WROWHQEHUJEWKLVPRUHIRUFHIXODQGWUDGLWLRQDODQWDJRQLVW-driven agenda 
UHIOHFWV1$72¶VORQJ-pursued comprehensive approach ± WKDWLV³DFRPELQDWLRQRf military 
and non-PLOLWDU\PHDQVWRVWDELOL]HFRXQWULHV´WKDWRWKHUVXVHWR³GHVWDELOL]H´6WROWHQEHUJ
D³+\EULG´ LVDFFRUGLQJO\FRLQHGDV³WKHGDUNUHIOHFWLRQ´RI1$72¶VFRPSUHKHQVLYH
approach, and accordingly, early warning and situation awareness, good governance and the 
resilience of societies become equally essential parts of deterrence and defence against hybrid 
threats (Stoltenberg 2015a7KLVQHFHVVLWDWHV³UHQHZHGDWWHQWLRQWRVWUDWHJLFFRPPXQLFDWLRQV´
DQG SXEOLF RXWUHDFK DQG HGXFDWLRQ ³WR EXLOG XS SXEOLF DZDUHQHVV DQG UHVLOLHQFH´ DQG
³VWUHQJWKHQWKHUROHRIDQLQIRUPHGFLYLOVRFLHW\LQHYHU\PHPEHUVWDWH´&DOKDp. 10).13 
NATO declared its readiness to address the specific challenges posed by ³hybrid 
warfare threats´in the Wales Summit Declaration of 5 September 2014 as a forceful response 
to the conflict in Ukraine. While 1$72¶VWUDGLWLRQDOWRROER[RIFROOHFWLYHGHIHQFHLVKDUGO\
SHUIHFWO\JHDUHGIRU³LQVLGLRXVDQGDPELJXRXVWKUHDWV´-RKQVRQS&DOKDS
4), countering hybrid warfare emerges as a continuing relevance and resilience test for the 
Alliance. 1$72¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHVSRQVHVWR³K\EULGWKUHDWV´KDYHEHHQIXUWKHUGHWDLOHGLQLWV
                                                 
13 For NATO 6WUDW&RP &HQWUH RI ([FHOOHQFH¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI VWUDWHJLF FRPPXQLFDWLRQ-related activities and 
capabilities, see http://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-strategic-communications (accessed 5 April 2018). 
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Readiness Action Plan, a roadmap for building capability packages, a comprehensive concept 
for creating an enhanced NATO response force, in a classified strategy for hybrid warfare and 
a cyber security action plan. Altogether, the ambiguity and gradient nature of hybrid tactics 
GLUHFWO\ FKDOOHQJH WKH RQWRORJLFDO XQGHUSLQQLQJV RI 1$72¶V core mission and strength as 
K\EULG DFWLYLWLHV PLJKW ³SURJUHVV LQFUHPHQWDOO\ WRZDUGV D WKUHDWHQLQJ VLWXDWLRQ ZKLOH
UHPDLQLQJXQGHU1$72¶V$UWLFOHWKUHVKROG´&DOKDS7KHGHWHFWLRQDQGGHILQLWLRQ
of a threat hence becomes significantly less straightforward, pointing at the need to renegotiate 
WKHVFRSHDQGVXEVWDQFHRI1$72¶VFROOHFWLYHGHIHQFHFODXVHLH$UWLFOHRIWKH:DVKLQJWRQ




This article has brought the notion of OS to bear on the thus far heavily policy-oriented hybrid 
warfare literature. As hybrid threats epitomise ontological insecurity, 1$72 DQG WKH (8¶V
synergistic discourse and emerging practice on countering the hybrid menace emerges as an 
attempt at the institutionalisation of their organisational OS-seeking. Tackling the hybrid 
challenges of the day in apparent unison further provides NATO and the EU a silver lining of 
a tightened cooperation between the two organisations. Further research could map the 
complex interactions between the OS-seeking strategies of these distinct intergovernmental 
institutions and their member states/societies with regard to countering hybrid warfare. It 
would be interesting to investigate, for example, how the traditional lines of division within 
the European community along the more Russia-friendly and Russia-wary countries might tap 
into the institutional dynamics of hybrid threat management of the EU and NATO. Moreover, 
the newly established special sub-institutions to confront hybrid threats within the EU along 
with the organisationally unaffiliated Centre of Excellence could themselves develop their own 
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identities, OS drives and placating routines, potentially generating organisational 
fragmentation and inter-agency tensions instead of bolstering the OS of the Union as a whole 
(cf. Steele 2017). 
With regard to the ethical drawbacks of effective hybrid threat management, such 
endeavour points at the problematic prospect of compromising the already fuzzy distinction 
between politics and war ± as according to the hybrid warfare paradigm, all politics becomes 
reduced to the potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. In that sense, hybrid 
warfaUHLVFORVHWRWKHFULWHULDRI³minimal wars, which consist in merely threatening the enemy 
with negotiations held in reserve´ (Clausewitz 1976, 604, emphasis in the original). The 
DOOHJHG³PLQLPDOLW\´ of such a way of warfare nonetheless has considerable potential to induce 
broad and deep securitisation of various public policy processes in the Western societies and 
their supranational organisations in question. Hybrid warfare and the emerging 
institutionalisation of its countering practices highlight the paradox of defending democratic 
security communities, as the efficacy of such defence might in fact be detrimental to some of 
the core organising principles of democracy. 
An alternative approach would be to argue that hybrid warfare, and the countering 
practices it is generating, have simply brought the nature of the modern power out into the 
open. As Foucault maintains in his Society Must Be DefendedOLEHUDO³FLYLOSHDFH´PXVWEH
XQGHUVWRRG DV D VHFUHW IRUP RI ZDU IRU ³ZDU LV WKH SULQFLSOH DQG PRWRU RI WKH H[HUFLVH RI
political power´ in general (Foucault 2003, p. 18). Viewed from such a perspective, hybrid 
warfare and its emerging management practices by the EU and NATO enable us to see what 
politics is allegedly all about anyway ± ³WKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRIZDUE\RWKHUPHDQV´(Foucault 
2003, p. 15). For the EU and NATO, hybrid warfare embodies not just the unsettling of the 
politics/war distinction but raises the fundamental question about the practical 
distinguishability of their physical and ontological security in the first place.  
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